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Apr. 18, 1967.]

R. D. REEDER LATHING CO., INC., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FRANCIS E. ALLEN, JR., Defendant and
Appellant.
[la,lb] Mechanics' Liens-Personal Judgment-Against Owner.In an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien, the part of the
judgment holding defendant-owner personally liable to plaintiff-lathing contractor was clearly erroneous where, though the
complaint stated that plaintiff performed its work at defendant's request, it appeared from plaintiff's own affidavits in
support of a motion for summary judgment that the request
came, not from defendant directly, but from his prime contractor.
[2] Id.-Personal Judgment-Against Owner.-The right to enforce a mechanic's lien against realty does not give rise to the
owners personal liability in the absence of a contract between
the lien claimant and the property owner.
[3] Judgments-Summary Judgments-Opposing Affidavits.-In
considering a summary judgment motion, the trial court must
determine whether the party opposing the i motion has presented, by affidavit, llny facts that give rise to a triable issue.
[4] Id.-Summa.ry Judgments-Issue to be Determined by Trial
Oourt.-O. a motion for summary judgment, the court does
not resolve conflicting factual allegations; the purpose of summary judgment procedure is to discover whether the parties
have evidence requiring assessment at a trial.
[5] Id.-Summary Judgments-Procedure.-Summary judgment
procedure is drastic and should be used with caution so that
the procedure does not become a substitute for trial.
[6] Id.-Summary Judgments-Affidavits-Oonstruction.-On a
motion for summary judgment, the moving party's affidavits
[1] Estoppel of mechanic's lien claimant as predicable on his
representations to owner as to payment made to claimant by contractor or subcontractor, note, 155 A.L.R. 350. See also Oal.Jur.2d,
Mechanics' Liens, § 166.
licK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Mechanics' Liens, § 230; [3]
Judgments, § 8a(9) (a); [4] Judgments, § 8a(10) (e); [5] Judgments, § 8a(6); [6] Judgments, §§ 8a(8) (d), 8a(9) (d); [7] Judgments, § 8a(10) (f); [8, 9] Mechanics' Liens, § 155; [10] Mechanics' Liens, §§ 150, 155; [11] Estoppel, § 28; [12] Mechanics' Liens,
§ 8; [13, 16] Judgments, § 8a (5)( d); Mechanics' Liens, § 198;
[14] Judgments, § 8a (7); [15] Mechanics' Liens, §§ 63, 155; [17]
Judgments, § 8a(9) (e).
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are strictly construed; those of his opponent, even if in con·
clusionary terms, are liberally construed.
[7] ld.-Summary Judgments-When Motion Properly Granted.Summary judgment is proper only where the moving party's
affidavits suffice to sustain a judgment in his favor and his
opponent does not, by affidavit, show facts sufficient to present
a triable issue.
[8] Mechanics' Liens-Estoppel to Claim Lien.-Estoppel may be
invoked against a liening materialman when, to induce pay.
ment from the owner, the materialman gives the contractor a
lien waiver, a false receipt of payment, or a promise to look
only to the contractor for his money.
[9] ld.-Estoppel to Claim Lien.-A materialman's failure, after
giving the contractor a receipt for payment of materials fur·
nished, to inform the owner that the contractor's checks given
in payment were dishonored gives rise to an estoppel to claim
a lien.
[10] ld.-Waiver: Estoppel to Claim Lien.-Waiver of or estoppel
to assert mechanic's lien rights does not require a formal contract, but may be inferred from the circumstances and the
parties' conduct.
[11] Estoppel-Equitable Estoppel-Silence.-In an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien, plaintiff corporation, a lathing contractor familiar with the contracting business, had a duty
to speak and its silence supported an inference of guile where
it was alleged that plaintiff and the prime contractor had a
secret contract pursuant to which plaintiff extended credit to
the prime contractor in exchange for all the lathing work and
agreed to furnish labor lien releases, signed in blank, or to
permit the prime contractor to prepare its own labor releases
and that defendant-owner was relying on the lien releases
supplied by the prime contractor in authorizing payment.
[12] Mechanics' Liens-Theory and Construction of Lien Law.Though the essential purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes is
to protect those who perform labor or furnish material toward
the improvement of another's property, inherent in this con·
cept is a recognition also of the rights of the owner of the
benefited property.
[13] Judgments-Summary Judgments-Issues Precluding Judg·
ment: Mechanics' Liens-lssues.-In an action to foreclose a
lathing contractor's mechanic's lien, whether the notation "RELEASE FROM LATHER MUST ACCOMPANY," which appeared at the
bottom of the voucher the owner used to authorize payments
from his construction lender, indicated the owner knew a lathing contractor was involved and that the owner was not igno.
rant of the prime contractor's failure to pay the lathing con[8] See Cal.Jur.2d, Mechanics' Liens, § 123.
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tractor presented a question of fact; and the owner was
entitled to have a trier of fact answer the question of what he
understood by the notation on the voucher.
[14] Id.-Summary Judgments-Motion.-The office of a motion
for summary judgment is merely to ferret out fact issues, not
to resolve them.
[15] Mecha.nics' Liens-Bonds: Estoppel to Claim Lien.-Though
Code Civ. Proc., § 1185.1, subd. (d), permits an owner the
precaution of requiring his contractor to take a bond to cover
defaults of those with whom he contracts, the statute does not
make it mandatory for the owner to require a bond from the
contractor, and the owner's right to demand a bond does not
preclude equitable estoppel of a lien claimant when the owner
fails to demand a bond.
[16] Judgments-Summary Judgments-Issues Precluding Judgment: Mechanics' Liens-Issues.-On plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment in an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien,
whether defendant-owner was reasonable in not requiring the
prime contractor to take out a bond or whether the owner's
failure to do so precluded his invoking estoppel against the
lien claimant was a question defendant was entitled to have
tried.
[17] Id. - Summary Judgments-Opposing Affida.vits-Sufficiency
-Summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and where there is
any showing of a triable issue, the motion should not he
granted; it should not be granted merely because opposing
affidavits were borrowed from a different case.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Steven S. Weisman, Judge. Reversed.
Action to foreclose a mechanic's lien. Summary judgment
for plaintiff reversed.
George Magit and Richard A. Perkins for Defendant and
Appellant.

Mantalica, Barclay & Teegarden and Lewis C. Teegarden
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant appeals from a summary
judgment for plaintiff in an action to foreclose a mechanic '8
lien. The judgment decreed that defendant was personally
liable to plaintiff for the value of the labor and materials it
supplied and impressed the improved property with mechanic 's liens.
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[130] The part of the judgment that defendant is personally liable to plaintiff is clearly erroneous. [2] In the absence of a contract between a lien claimant and the property
owner, the right to enforce a mechanic's lien against real
property does not give rise to personal liability of the owner.
(Golden Gate Bldg. Materials 00. v. Fireman (1928) 205 Cal.
174, 177-178 [270 P. 214] ; Roberts v. Security Trust & Sav.
Bank (1925) 196 Cal. 557, 573-584 [238 P. 673].) [lb] Although the complaint states that plaintiff performed its work
at the request of defendant, it appears from plaintiff's own
affidavits that the request came, not from defendant directly,
but from his prime contractor.
The complaint alleged that plaintiff supplied lathing materials and performed labor, for which it had not been paid,
in the construction of houses on 18 separate lots owned by
defendan.t. In an amended answer defendant denied that
plaintiff had performed the work alleged and set up affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel.
Plaintiff then filed its motion for summary jUdgment (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c) , supported by the affidavit and 'declaration
of its president, Robert D. Reeder, and the declaration of
Robert M. Thomas, a materialman. Defendant filed counteraffidavits.
[3] In considering a motion for summ.ary judgment the
trial court must determine whether the defendant has by affi.
davit presented any facts that give rise to a triable i~ue.
(Stationers Oorp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (1965) 62 Cal.2d
412, 417 [42 Cal.Rptr. 449, 398 P.2d 785] ; Eagle Oil & Refin,ing 00. v. Prentice (1942) 19 Cal.2d 553, 555 [122 P.2d 264].)
[4] The cour~ does not resolve conflicting factual allegations, for the purpose of the procedure is to discover. whether
the parties have evidence requiring assessment at a trial.
[5] Such summary procedure is drastic and should be
used with caution so that it does not become a substitute for
trial. (Towne Development 00. v. Lee (1965) 63 Cal.2d 147,
148 [45 Cal.Rptr. 316, 403 P.2d 724] ; Stationers Oorp. v. Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc., supra; Desny v. Wilder (1956) 46 Cal.2d
715, 725-726 [299 P.2d 257]; Ooyne v. Krempels (1950) 36
Cal.2d 257, 260-261 [223 P.2d 244] ; Eagle Oil & Refining 00.
v. Prentice, supra, at p. 556.) [6] Accordingly, the affidavits of the moving party are strictly construed and those of
his opponent, even if in conclusionary terms, are liberally
construed. [7] Summary judgment is proper only if the
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affidavits in support of the moving party are sufficient to sustain a judgment in his favor and his opponent does not by
affidavit show facts sufficient to present a triable issue.
Examination of the affidavits in this case shows that plaintiff has established for purposes of its motion that it performed the claimed work on defendant's houses and that it
has not been paid. It did the work pursuant to a contract with
the prime contractor for the lathing and plastering, West
Valley Plastering, Inc., which is now bankrupt. The critical
issue is whether plaintiff has waived its lien or is estopped to
a.ssert it.
Defendant contends that plaintiff conspired with West Valley to keep defendant ignorant of plaintiff's contribution to
the construction so that defendant would be unable to protect
himself against plaintiff's potential lien. According to defendant's affidavits, toward the end of 1962 West Valley was experiencing difficulty getting finances to carry on its business.
In disregard of West Valley's weak financial condition and
relying for security primarily on its access to lien rights,
plaintiff offered West Valley extended credit in exchange for
West Valley's agreement to subcontract all its lathing work
to plaintiff. West Valley agreed to those terms and also that
plaintiff "would either furnish WEST VALLEY with labor lien
releases signed in blank, or permit WEST V ALLEY to prepare
its own labor releases, which WEST VALLEY could then in turn
complete as progress payments became due from buildings
and owners, thereby permitting WEST V ALLEY to receive its
money when due. In this connection, [plaintiff] would provide
WEST VALLEY with a list of all lathers employed by [plaintiff] so that West Valley, in turn, could type in the names of
said lathers for the purpose of completing the labor lien releases. . . ." Defendant makes further allegations from
which a trier of fact might infer that Thomas Building Supply Co., which was the only materialman on the job to whose
existence defendant had been alerted, was aiding plaintiff in
carrying West Valley on the shaky credit basis by providing
the materials that plaintiff supplied defendant. A trier of fact
might also infer that plaintiff had a financial interest in
Thomas Building Supply Co., which was later reorganized
into Deering Building Co. by the president of plaintiff and
the president of Thomas Building Supply Co.
Thus, defendant seeks to prove a scheme whereby plaintiff
extended imprudent credit without bearing the risk itself but

378

R.

D.

REEDER LATHING CO. V.

ALLEN

[66 C.2d

counting on the lien law to leave the risk on the unsuspecting
and innocent property owner. To further the scheme, plaintiff
and West Valley had to conceal plaintiff's existence and identity from defendant, else he would demand a lien waiver from
plaintiff before paying West Valley, thus destroying either
plaintiff's secret security or West Valley's advantageous
credit arrangement. In support of his allegations defendant
filed affidavits by himself and his attorney and declarations by
Addis Johnston and Raymond J. Croteau, formerly the president and vice-president of West Valley. The Johnston and
Croteau declarations had been prepared for use in a different
lawsuit. After the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, defendant moved for reconsideration and
supplied declarations of Johnston and Croteau prepared specifically for the ease at bench, setting out substantially the
same facts as their other declarations. Defendant's motion
was denied.
These affidavits raise triable issues of fact in regard to estoppel. [8] Estoppel may be invoked against a Hening
materialman when he gives the contractor a waiver of lien, a
false receipt of payment, or a promise to look only to the
contractor for his money, to induce payment from the owner.
(E.g.,·E~ K. ·Wood Lumber Co. v. Higgins (1960) 54 Cal.2d
91, 94 [4 Cal.Rptr. 523, 351 P.2d 795]; Ware Supply Cf>. V.I
Sacramento Savings &- Loan Assn. (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d'
398, 408-409 [54 Cal.Rptr. 674] ; J. &; W. C. Shull v. Doerr
(1930) 110 Cal.App. 613, 615-616 [294 P. 464].) [9] After
giving the contractor a receipt for payment a materialman's
failure to inform the owner that the contractor's checks to
him were dishonored also gives rise to an estoppel. (Jaekle
v. Halton (1938) 25 Cal.App.2d 706 [78 P.2d 441].)
[10] "Waiver -of [or estoppel to assert] mechanic's lien
rights does not require a formal contract, but may be inferred
from the circumstances and the conduct of the parties." (E.
Ie lVood Lumber Co. v. Higgins, supra, at p. 94; see also
flooclwin Tile &- Brick Co. v. DeVries (1944) 234 Iowa 566,
369 [3 N.W.2d 310, 155 A.IJ.R. 346] ; Detroit Graphite Cf>. v.
Carncy (1935) 175 Okla. 583 [53 P.2d 584, 586].)
[11] Given the ulh'gl,a secret contract between plaintiff and "\Vcst Valley, plaintiff's familiarity with the contracting business and its alleged knowledge that defendant
was relying on lien releases supplied by West Valley in
authorizing payments, plaintiff had a duty to speak, and its
silence supports an inference of guile. (See Code Civ. Proc.,
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§ 1962, subd. 3, now EYid. Code, § 623; California Lettuce
Growers, Inc. Y. Union Sugar Co. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 474, 483
[289 P.2d 785, 49 A.L.R.2d 496] ; People v. Ocean Shore R.R.,
Inc. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 406, 421 [196 P.2d 570, 6 A.L.R.2d
1179] ; American Bldg. etc. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. (1932)
214 Cal. 608, 617-618 [7 P.2d 305]; Bruce v. Jefferson Union
High School Dist. (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 632, 634 [26 Cal.
Rptr. 762] ; Dettamanti v. Lompoc Union School Dist. (1956)
143 Cal.App.2d 715, 721 [300 P.2d 78] ; Balestreiri v. Arques
(1942) 49 CaI.App.2d 664, 669 [122 P.2d 277] ; Merry v. Garibaldi (1941)48 Cal.App.2d 397, 401, 403 [119 P.2d 768].)
[12] '" While the essential purpose of the mechanics' lien
statutes is to protect those who have performed labor or furnished material towards the improvement of the property of
another [citation], inherent in this concept is a recognition
also of the rights of the owner of the benefited property. It
has been stated that the lien laws are for the protection of
property owners as well as lien claimants. . . . ' " (Borchers
Bros. v. Buckeye Incubator Co. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 234, 239 [28
Cal.Rptr. 697, 379 P.2d 1] [quoting from Alta Bldg. Material
·Co. v. Cameron (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 299, 303 [20 Cal.Uptr.
713]] ; William If. Birch & Co. v. Magic :l'r·ansit Co. (1903)
139 Cal. 496,498-499 [73 P. 238].)
[13] The only fact to which plaintiff points to contradict
defendant's allegations of inequitable suppression of information is relevant, not to plaintiff's role in setting the trap for
defendant, but to the reasonableness of defendant's reliance
on the nonexistence of the facts plaintiff conspired to conceal.
At the bottom of one of the vouchers defendant used to authorize payments from his construction lender appears the
notation "RELEASE FROM LATHER MUST ACCOMPANY." Plaintiff contends that this notation indicates that defendant knew
that a lathing contractor was involved and that he was therefore not ignorant of the true facts. Defendant replies, with
dictionary and technical citations, l that a lather is a workman, not a contractor, and tllat lien releases from all workmen
did accompany the vouchers. Plaintiff's contention presents a
question of fact. What defendant understood by the notation
lWebster's New International Dictionary (2d ed.); 1 Dictionary of
Occupation Titles (3d ed. 1965) Lather, Code No. 842,781, Division of
Manpower Administration, Bureau of Employment Security, U.S. Department of Labor; Directory of National and International Labor Unions in
the United States, 1965, Bull. No. 149, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S.
Department of Labor.
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on the voucher is a question defendant is entitled to have
answered by a trier of fact. [14] The office of a motion for
summary judgment is merely to ferret out fact issues, not to
resolve them. (Stationers Corp. v. Dun &- Bradstreet, Inc.,
supra, 62 C,a1.2d 412, 417; Eagle Oil ill Refining 00. v. Prentice, supra, 19 Cal.2d 553, 555.)
[15] Plaintiff contends that defendant could have protected himself against potential liens that would force him to
pay twice for the same work or suffer the loss of his property
by requiring the contractor to take out a bond to co~r the
defaults of those with whom he contracts. This precaution is
permitted by Code of Civil Procedure section 1185.1, subdivision (d). The statute does not make it mandatory for the
owner to require a bond from the contractor, however, and we
find no basis for holding that the owner's right to demand a
bond precludes an equitable estoppel when he does not do so.
Several factors discourage the home builder from demanding
a bond of his contractor (see Barnard, Limitation of Owner's
Liability for Mechanics' Liens (1964) 16 Hastings L.J. 179,
184; Comment (1964) 16 Hastings L.J. 198, 199), and there is
some evidence-including the fact that the same bankruptcy
by the contractor that precipitated this case also resulted in at
least i40ther suits to foreclose liens-that it is the general
practice in the industry for the owner to forego requiring a
bond. (See Gaulden & Dent,More on Mechanics Liens, Stop
Notices and the Like (1966) 54 Cal.L.Rev. 179, 204-205; Hearing of the Senate Interim Judiciary Committee, August 20-21,
1956, at 112-114, cited in Comment (1963) 51 Cal.L.Rev.
331, 356, fn. 194; Third Progress Report to the Legislature by
Senate Interim .Judiciary Committee, 1955, pp. 85, 87-88.)
[16] Whether defendant was reasonable in not requiring
West Valley to take out a bond or whether his failure to do so
should preclude him from invoking estoppel is another question defendant is entitled to have tried.
Plaintiff contends, finally, that we cannot consider the
.Johnston and Croteau declarations since they were filed in a
different case. 'Ve find no authority on using affidavits filed in
another action. [17] Since summary judgment is a drastic
remedy and should not be granted if there is any showing
of a triable issue, it should not be granted merely because
opposition affidavits were borrowed from a different case. Such
affidavits are as persuasive of the existence of evidence
that could be produced as affidavits of the same potential
witnesses specifically prepared for the case at bench. More-

over, defendant produced such affidavits in support of a motion for reconsideration, and it was an abuse of discretion for
the court to deny that motion.
The judgment is reversed.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J.,
~nd Sullivan, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied May 17,
1967.
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